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Summarv
This study is concerned with the interactions among three systems of social control
and the repercussions of these systems upon standards of decency and patterns of be-
haviour in the northern Groningen clay area between 1770 and 1914. Guideline has
been the relation between people's perceptions and expectations about (aspects of)
their lives and the actual satisfaction they can find in their way ofliving.
In the period under study there were numerous groups that had diverging percep-
tions and satisfactions. These groups were found in a variety of spheres. In the socio-
economic sphere, the dominant factor in the northem Groningen countryside was the
ever-widening gap between farmers and labourers. In the religious sphere, liberal
protestants and strict Calvinists opposed each other.
Central to the book is the concept of social control, i.e. the mechanism by which
people's behaviour is guided and corrected by members of the same group or those
of other groups. It includes formal as well as informal means of control. The main
question put forward here is how various gl'oups and individuals tried to harmonize
their perceptions and satisfactions through social control. In answering this question
three different systens of social control have been distinguished.
The development of these three systems is the subject of the first part of the book.
The first system of social control to be considered, is that of popular culture. The use
of the term 'popular culture' is not without danger; it is used here to indicate a sys-
tem of social control that is largely infonnal, as it is based upon unwritten rules
(codes, values) which are maintained through unofficial procedures.
At the end of the eighteenth century there were several informal mechanisrns of
social control in the Groningen clay area. Moral standards and values were not only
transmitted by gossip, mockery and - more incidentally - charivari or rough music
but also through the oral tradition. Even belief in magic and sorcery could function
as a means of social control. Finally, there were numerous customs that concerned
mutual help and infbrmal poor relief. These regulated relations between err.rployers
and employees and between villagers among themselves.
In the course of the nineteenth century northern Groningen society became more
and more divided into distinct groups. The polarization between large farmers and
their labourers was mainly a result of economic development. The number of farms
hardly increased, whereas the population grew enormously. This led to a deteriora-
tion in the position of the working class and resulted in growing (seasonal) unem-
ployment and a weakening of social bonds.
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This polarization also had political, psychological and cultural aspects. Farrners
not only saw their prosperity grow, but their political power as well, and in many
places they became the local elite, filling the vacuum leti by the former gentry.
Moreover, at tlrat time they were also being influenced by the views and ideas of the
Enlightenment which were disseminated through cultural and reading societies.
These organizations provided the farmers witlr both intellectual and social prestige.
Apart from polarization in the social sphere, there was polarization in the religious
sphere as well. This was caused by the Dutch Reformed Church's liberal ideas and
the state's power in church matters. As a result. calvinistic groups whose beli:fs
were based strongly upon orthodoxy and inner conviction, no longer felt at home in
the Reformed Church. Ultimately this led to the 1834 Secession, which. in due
course, gained many adherents.
Religious developments strongly defined the kind of social control exercised by
the churches. The mechanisms of social control and their impact varied greatly
among the the various religious groups. Within the orthodox churches there was a
strong revival of early Calvinist discipline. Initially there was a strong tendency to
base beliefs upon personal experience, which was wlty there was a close connection
with certain aspects of popular culture. Within these churches the use of mechanisms
of social control and elements of popular religion played an important role. 'Super-
stit ion' and personal religious experience were strongly related. However, some as-
pects of popular culture, such as certain forms of entertainment and premarital sex,
were strongly criticized. Gradually, the secessionist churches evolved towards ortho-
doxy, in which obedience to biblical values and a strong organizational structure
were considered more important than pietistic experience of God. Ties with popular
culture weakened; in due course these Calvinists even became its strongest adver-
sanes.
ln the process of pillarization, religious polarization grew more rigid. The leaders
of the extreme protestants obtained greater influence on local and national political
levels. This became clear in their campaign against certain aspects of popular cul-
ture. Unlike before, large parts of the middle and working classes supported this
campaign, and as a result popular culture and the system of social control based on it
disintegrated sti l I further.
A lot of people that had become disillusioned with the Dutch Reformed Church
became members of the secessionists churches. Others. however. gave up on Chris-
tianity altogether. These atheists were found mainly among the higher and the lower
social classes, and in the eastem part ofthe region.
Next to popular culture and religion, the authorities constituted the third power
with respect to social control. As a result of political processes. there were, between
the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, major changes in the way in which public life
was regulated. From the early nineteenth century onwards centralism characterized
national politics. This was reflected in legislation and its effects on a local level.
New areas for making rules were claimed and occupied by various authorities. This
happened at the expense ofthe churches and popular culture. which lost a lot oftheir
power of exerting social control. For example, the state took over control in the areas
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of education and marriage, and certain elements of social control within popular cul-
ture, such as charivari and every-day violence, were made criminal offenses. Tax
evasion, poaching and smuggling gave rise to other clashes of interest between the
central state and the local population.
On the other hand, the govemment was sometimes forced to take over in areas in
which the other systems of social control had lost their grip. This appezrrs for in-
stance liom the introduction of regulations concerning mutual help and poor relief.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the authorities were confionted with poverty,
unemployment, crime and social unrest. Growing social tensions, partly caused by
the weakening of the old mechanisms of social control, evoked stronger social con-
trol by the state. In the countryside this led to various repressive measures: first there
was the introduction of state police, then the introduction of a military police force.
At the end of the nineteenth century morality became a hot issue in both national
and local politics. This was partly caused by the growing power of conservative,
mainly Christian, political parties. Fligh moral standards were emphasized and a cru-
sade was waged against such aspects of working-class culture as drinking, popular
entertainment, every-day violence, institutionalized begging on New Year's Day and
all kinds of festivities.
As a consequence of the above-mentioned evelopments, infomal social control
was marginalized. Some of its elements, for instance institutionalized mutual help
and informal poor relief, disappeared altogether. Other social mechanisms lost influ-
ence because their impact became more and more confined to certain groups within
society. without any effect on the population at large. Gossip was still quite common
in rnost groups, but the gossip circles had become more uniform and, probably, smal-
ler than before. Heavy social sanctions, such as the use of charivari. were mainly ap-
plied within the lower social classes.
Remnants of earlier popular culture were mixed with survival strategies that were
used by the lowest social classes to protect themselves against deteriorating social
conditions. These srategies included petty theft and smuggling, as well as ex-
pressions of discontent. 'Ihis resulted in a culture of poverty that among some parts
of the population lasted well into the twentieth century. Within other groups, espec-
ially among large farmers, other standards of behaviour prevailed. Their group cul-
ture was based upon rationality, education, domesticity and 'civilization'. The
micldle classes took up a position in between the extremes of the farmers on the one
hand and the labourers on the other. Gradually they developed a group culture of
their own, in which domesticity played a large part, and in which diligence and thrift
became important values. In this they opposed both the farmers' conspicuous con-
sumption and the workers' culture of poverty.
In the second part of the book the question is raised in what ways changes in the sy-
sterns of social control have influenced the development and maintenance of moral
standards in the areas of public festivities, leisure activities, nrutual relations. and
people's private lives. The nineteenth century saw the rise of processes that can be
described in such terms as'increasing decency', ' increasing rationalization'and'pri-
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vatlzatron.. up to tne early nlneteentn century, most torTns or puDllc entertalnment -
fairs, festivals and gatherings at inns for instance - were closely linked to socio-
economic life. On these occasions business deals were concluded. news was trans-
mitted and future partners were selected. In popular culture, the relations between
employers and employees, between merchants and customers, and between neigh-
bours were structured by means of numerous social and cultural events. Emoluments
and informal poor relief were mainly administered on festive days. And matters of
sexuality and marriage were for a great part dealt with in public, so that the com-
munity could exert a strong influence. Public occasions served these social and sex-
ual functions for practically the whole population. In the eighteenth century, attempts
by the provincial authorities and the church to improve the standards of cultural and
sexual life, had failed.
From the early nineteenth century onwards, however, attempts at civilization were
intensified. The church and authorities were highly critical of what they considered
to be public excesses. Gradually they received more support from the local elite, the
rich farmers, who had come to dislike the conventional forms of popular entertain-
ment and had taken to new, more civilized ways of spending their spare time. Many
of them had joined reading and cultural societies, which offered not only intellectual
satisfaction but social prestige and status as well.
That the attitudes of the local elite were changing also becomes clear from chan-
ges that took place in labour relations. As the farmers began to distinguish themsel-
ves intellectually from the lower social classes, they increasingly came to dislike the
presence of servants at their tables. This led to the introduction of separate servants'
quarters. The farmers also no longer upheld the customs, festivities and poor relief
that had once brought at least some pleasure to the lives of both servants and labou-
rers. On their part, though some of them joined the new secessionist churches, most
labourers and servants remained connected with certain forms of popular culture and
refused to reshape their ways of enjoying themselves. At the end of the nineteenth
century this growing resistance led to the rise of a labour movement.
The same process of rationalization can be detected in changes in the social rela-
tions between villagers. Activities that, till the end of the eighteenth century, had
been undertaken collectively - such as the upkeep of the communal infrastructure;
mutual help with respect o birth, illness and death; and informal poor relief - slowly
disappeared uring the nineteenth century. To a certain extent this was an expression
of social and religious polarization that broke down the unity within local society. ln
vain local authorities tried to stop this process by drawing up rules concerning neigh-
bourly duties and other elements of rural culture they thought worth preserving.
However, these same authorities forbade the festivities and forms of informal poor
relief, such as begging on New Year's Day, that had till then been an essential part of
traditional culture. In this way they themselves contributed to the disintegration pro-
CESS.
All these changes in recreational and social activities were accompanied by a pri-
vatization of marriage, sexuality and domestic life in general. Many points of contact
between the private household and the community, which had also been application
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points for social control, were lost. Moreover, the church and authorities tried to fos-
ter the privatization of what were increasingly considered to be private matters. Only
the orthodox church still exercised strong control.
Nevertheless, there were only few changes in people's sexual behaviour. For most
groups premarital intercourse rernained a well-accepted step towards marriage. as is
clear from the high incidence of pregnant brides. However, privatization of sexual
af-fairs and diminishing social control led to a steady rise in the number of illegitim-
ate children. Without the appropriate mechanisms of social control. fathers-to-be
could no longer be 'shotgunned' into marriage. In addition, and in working-class
subculture in particular, a pattern developed of concubinage and marriage postpone-
ment.
Gradually a diversification of standards and values concerning sexuality. maniage
and domestic lif'e arose. This was tbremost a social development. The farmers were
the first group to abandon the old customs conceming courtship and man'iage. Sever-
al middle-class groups, such as teachers, quickly followed suit. Their preoccupation
with domesticity, economy and diligence manifested itself mainly in a withdrawal
into private lif'e and a castirlg otf of traditional social control where private matters
were concerned.
Another matter that is investigated in the present study is the question whether there
were, in the past, any clear'civil izing offensives'. Actually, three such offensives
can be distinguished. The first one, launched in the seventeenth century by the Dutch
Refbrmed Church and continuing into the eighteenth, was hardly effective. This was
because it was too far removed from the ideas and world of the local population. Be-
sides. the means of social control that would have been needed to make it successful
simply were not there at the time. The second offensive took place in the first half of
the nineteenth century and continued where the first one had left off. However, it
was mainly supported by the rising class of farmers and was in fact aimed at the far-
mers in the first place. In that respect this second offensive fits nicely into an Eliasi-
an pattern of culture as a status symbol. In as far as the off'ensive was directed to-
wards the lower classes, it had hardly any success.
The third civilizing offensive, launched in the second half of the nineteenth centu-
ry, combined the methods used in the first and second offensives. This ot'fensive was
more clearly aimed at the lower classes than its predecessor. Moreover, it was more
readily accepted by the population as a whole. This third offensive did not irnpose
new standards of behaviour forcef\lly. It fitted in nicely with certain tendencies that
already lived arnong the population.
The developments in northem Groningen can be described as a process of formaliza-
tion of social control. The social control system of the authorities greatly gained in
momentum after the establishment of the central state. The state-formation process in
the flrst half of the nineteenth century led the state to regulate numerous matters that
earlier had lain outside its scope.
Another factor underlying the formalization of social control in the nirreteenth cen-
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disappearance ofpopular culture, the authorities and, to a lesser extent, the churches,
were forced to take over in those areas where they thought social control to be neces-
sary. In doing so the authorities did not create new forms of social control from
scratch; they formalized and institutionalized existing mechanisms.
Not only can one trace out a process of formalization, but also a process of on-
going fragmentation of social control, a process that had already started before the
period under study, and that, in fact, still has not finished today. The outdated stereo-
type of a uniform and static popular culture does not therefore apply to eighteenth-
century Groningen.
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